I too hold the mantle: International Day of Democracy

Today, 15^th September 2015, little or not so little fifteen year old Muteteli from Rwanda aspires to one day be Member of Parliament. She aspires to represent constituents from her region, help young children grow up to be the best they could possibly be; to live to their full potential. Young Muteteli aspires to assist farmers to produce more food for internal use and export, teachers be well qualified, hospitals to have well run facilities and to overall harness the energies and innovation of the promising Rwandan youth.

“I will one day be Member of Parliament, I will make good decisions and I will make Rwanda proud,” she muses amidst a smile. Are her dreams valid? Very much so.

(The Bring Back Our Girls Movement)

If one asks Muteteli whether she is aware of what a civil society organization is, she will quickly respond with a resounding yes. “They are the people who hold my Member of Parliament representative accountable and raise issues on what needs to be done more of.” If one probes further on whether she would want a civil society during her parliamentary tenure, the answer is also a resounding yes. “Just as my mother holds me to account on my wrongs, I too want people to tell me where I should focus my energies.”

Ban Ki moon rightly put it when he stated that civil society is the oxygen of democracy. It acts as a catalyst for social progress and economic growth and plays a critical role in keeping Government accountable; helps represent the diverse interests of the population, including its most vulnerable groups; that being the women and youth.

Article 29 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance stipulates that, ‘State Parties shall recognize the crucial role of women in development and strengthening of democracy.’

What does this mean?

In the words of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, “No one benefits if women are held back; we have to change mind sets, not just laws. In Rwanda, more women than ever before are serving in positions of responsibility and leadership in government and in the work place. These role models, in turn, shape the expectations and the missions of the next generations”.

Pic Credit: Huffington Post

Democracy and its ideals as defined by the United Nations is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. This means that there is rule of law whereby constitutions are upheld, term limits are respected, civil society groups can exercise their freedoms whilst holding government to account, elections are free and fair and the institutions within the state are free to deliver on public services equitably without interference from bureaucratic red tape and corruption.

This year’s International Day of Democracy theme is on creating spaces for civil society and a study by Civicus indicates a nexus between democracy, civil society engagement and women’s leadership.

Beginning with its leadership, it is reported Rwanda claimed the world’s highest percentage of women in parliament in 2003 and today, its women hold 64% of the country’s legislative seats. Rwanda is arguably run efficiently and effectively with a fast rising private sector and civil society which is steered by pragmatic sound policies and legislation from its political institutions. The study indicates that Rwandan civil society’s greatest strengths is its relatively positive values; that its civil society, to a great extent, nurtures and upholds positive values such as anti-corruption practices, gender equity, poverty eradication, tolerance and democracy promotion. This is a country that survived genocide in the 90’s and more or less built its economy from scratch.

The African Union came to the succinct realization that women hold the mantle in promoting democracy and good governance and as such, during its 24th Heads of State Summit in January 2015, ended with a strong call for women’s empowerment in Africa as a step towards achieving the goals of Agenda 2063, its blueprint development strategy for the next 50 years.

 

Pic Credit: Afronline.org

It cannot be overemphasized how crucial the role of civil society and more so women’s participation in democracy building is.  Ban Ki moon also rightly put it when he stated as follows:

“Women hold up more than half the sky and represent much of the world’s unrealized potential. They are the educators. They raise the children. They hold families together and increasingly drive economies. They are natural leaders. We need their full engagement… in government, business and civil society.”

Towards another resource curse? Remittances and support for democracy in Africa

This article was originally published on The Conversation

Remittance recipients whose priority is the socioeconomic improvements of their lives were found to be less engaged with democratic processes.

Much has been written about the impact of remittance inflows on economic and social outcomes, including economic development, inequality and poverty. But little is known about the effect they have on the attitude of remittance recipients to democracy in sub-Saharan Africa.

Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have recorded substantial increases in inflows of money from other countries. These include official aid and foreign direct investment. Remittances now exceed official aid in many. They also include remittances from relatives who have left their home country and resettled elsewhere.

A recent study finds that remittances have a different impact when it comes to support for democracy. Although similar studies have been done in Mexico, this is the first to use the priorities of citizens as the basis for studying the relationship between remittances and political engagement in sub-Saharan Africa.

The study relied on the Afrobarometer data. This contains a series of national surveys on the attitudes of citizens towards democracy, market, civil society and other aspects of development. The surveys are available for 36 sub-Saharan African countries.

Positive and negative effects

There is a wide body of literature on the impact of remittances on poverty alleviation and reduction of income inequality. These cash transfers can also help recipients survive periods when they have shortfalls in their other incomes. Remittances may under some circumstances also contribute to economic growth.

They have negative effects too. Remittances have been found to have a negative effect on the quality of institutions. This is because remittances can be seen as substitutes to government spending on public services. They do this by enabling recipients to buy services they would otherwise be entitled to demand from the state.

When remittance recipients buy pubic services such as education or health from the private sector, for example, this often leads to a decline in government effectiveness and accountability. It may also result in an increase in corruption.

Impact depends on where priorities lie

The impact depends on the priorities remittance recipients have chosen. Recipients who have chosen rights and freedom as their priority were found to be as supportive of democracy as much as non-recipients. But recipients who rank higher improvements in their standard of living were found to be less engaged with democratic processes.

The study’s findings strike at the core of democratisation theories which have singled the growth of middle income earners as one of the driving forces for democracy.

The umbilical cord between remittances and democratic processes is the provision of public goods, a role fulfilled by the state. Public goods include public services such as health, education and roads.

The incentive therefore for supporting democracy depends, among other factors, on whether the priority chosen by remittance recipients is a good that can be exclusively provided by the state. But it also depends on whether the state is willing and able to provide such a public good.

Remittances enable recipients to buy public services. This means they no longer have an incentive to hold government accountable for providing, or improving the quality of, pubic services.

Many citizens in sub-Saharan Africa rely on remittances from another country. Reuers/Omar Faruk

The effect of remittances on democracy

Recent studies have also explored the effects of these inflows on the behaviour and attitude of citizens to politics. Migrant remittances have the potential to lower political participation by recipients.

Yet little is known about the effects of receiving remittances on the legitimacy of democracy in Africa, a region where democracy is a relatively new concept. Legitimacy of democracy is defined as the degree of endorsement and support for democracy by the citizens.

Democracy has been posited as a universal value and then associated with many desirable features, among them development and social welfare. This has raised the question why some countries are democratic while others are not. Political scientists argue that the legitimacy of democracy is an important determinant of the level of democracy supplied in a nation.

Following this line, several researchers have done valuable analyses to determine the most prominent socioeconomic characteristics that may explain the degree of support for democracy of citizens.

Other researchers have explored the link between the level of educationand democracy. They tested to what extent the different levels of education may increase the likelihood that citizens support democracy.

The findings of the study on the impact of remittances on attitudes to democracy point to the risk of remittances hindering the development of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. A lot depends on whether the balance of Africa’s population tilts more towards individuals who are more concerned about improving their standard of living than rights and freedom.

Author

1. Maty KonteResearch Fellow at United Nations University

Disclosure statement

Maty Konte works for United-Nations University. She is affiliated with United-Nations University (UNU-MERIT).

The Conversation is funded bythe National Research Foundation, the Knight Foundation and Barclays Africa. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is a Strategic Partner.

The Growth-Governance Paradox in Africa

By Pierre Englebert and Gailyn Portelance

The essential features of Africa’s Growth-Governance Paradox were delineated in 1990 by scholar Jeffrey Herbst. Economic reform programs prescribed by international financial institutions, often called structural adjustment, were premised on reducing the distributional role of the state and maximizing the play of market forces. Herbst noted a contradiction: governing regimes were being encouraged to alter the clientelistic political systems on which their power rested.¹

A quarter-century later, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced the most continuous period of economic growth since the 1950s and 1960s. What explains this development: high commodity prices, economic liberalization, better governance and democratization? Some development economists, such as Mushtaq Khan, do not see the necessity of implementing the full “good governance agenda” to achieve a turnaround in economic performance. A theoretical framework, “developmental patrimonialism”, has also been advanced by a group of Africa experts to explain authoritarian modernization in a few countries.

Blending qualitative and quantitative analyses, Pierre Englebert and Gailyn Portelance move beyond competing analyses. They inquire why relatively small changes in governance in a group of African countries called “developers” (in contrast to “laggards”) has had such a disproportionate impact on economic performance, and notably in attracting foreign direct investment. Their preliminary report and key hypothesis warrant careful study by scholars, policy analysts, and domestic and external investors.² It can precipitate a wave of incisive research and better understanding of the political economy of contemporary Africa.

THE PARADOXICAL POLITICS OF GROWTH

Over the last year and a half, we have been involved in a research project that addresses some of the questions that have also been central to AfricaPlus since its founding.³. In this contribution we summarize our progress and offer the main hypothesis that our research has generated so far.

We address two central questions. First, is the economic growth of resource-poor African countries linked to improvements in their economic governance? Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, what is the political rationality of such governance improvements? Interestingly, as this research note will hopefully make clear, the answer we found to the first question significantly altered the nature of the second question.

A few words of clarification. By economic governance we refer to both rule-of-law type governance (e.g., property rights and corruption) and state or bureaucratic capabilities, or what Mushtaq Khan calls “market-enhancing” and “growth-enhancing” governance.⁴ The political rationality question addresses what struck us as a potential contradiction between governance-based explanations of African growth and the general understanding of Africa’s previous stagnation as the result of neopatrimonial politics.⁵ If African politics is based on a neopatrimonial logic of instrumentalization of the state and its resources for political benefit, how can it produce governance improvements without rulers committing political suicide? Did something change in the nature of politics in some African countries that suddenly made such improvements politically feasible? This is an important question because its answer might challenge our understanding of African politics.

There has been significant innovative scholarship on these very questions over the last few years. Some authors have suggested that the political transformation of the early 1990s have been sufficient to usher in a greater degree of institutional accountability and, with it, more responsive governance.⁶ Others have called our attention to the wide variation in the extent of neopatrimonialism in Africa with the result that some regimes have been able to shape more developmental governance.⁷ More recent contributions in the same vein have suggested that special features of neopatrimonialism can make a difference. Particularly when regimes can concentrate rents and develop longer time horizons, neopatrimonialism can be developmental.⁸ Finally, some recent contributions argue that clientelism in and of itself is universal and not inimical to better governance, provided existing political arrangements, and particularly alliances between political and business elites, share a commitment to growth.⁹

Much of this work has focused on a few case studies of apparent developmental success stories such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, or successful moments in other countries such as the 1960-75 period in Côte d’Ivoire or the 1964-78 period in Malawi. Ethiopia and Rwanda, particularly, have figured centrally in the discussion of the possibility of developmental statehood in Africa, with the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi making no secret of the ambitions of his regime in this respect.¹⁰ These two countries are, however, in some fundamental ways continental outliers, not least because of their very unique security situations. Having learned a lot from their experiences, we were nevertheless eager to go beyond these specific case studies and try to identify more aggregate patterns, since many more African countries have experienced significant growth.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH FINDINGS

Methodologically, we have limited ourselves to resource-poor countries in order to control for the widespread commodity boom which is responsible for much of the continent’s recent performance. We first ranked all African economies by their rate of per capita economic growth from 2000 to 2013. We then excluded those that derived more than 10% of their GDP from mineral rents. From the remaining countries we selected two “most different” samples: one including the ten fastest growing countries and the other the ten slowest growing. The first group, which we call the “developers,” includes Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, and averages 5.33% growth.¹¹ The second group—the “laggards”—comprises Burundi, the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Malawi, Togo and Zimbabwe, with a collective growth performance of -0.45%. A visual inspection of their divergent growth trajectories suggests the need for some explanation.

Our next step was to ask whether similar differences are observable between these two groups in the realm of governance. Using raw scores from the Mo Ibrahim Index which seemed more reliable that the usual World Bank aggregate governance indicators,¹² we do indeed observe statistically significant variations in some rule-of-law and capacity-type indicators of economic governance.

However, once we looked more carefully at these differences, we observed that they were constant and rather limited in absolute terms except, interestlingly, for bureaucracy and red tape . In other words, for the whole period of time for which the Mo Ibrahim Index has data, these two groups of countries display steady but usually limited differences in governance quality, in contrast to their increasingly divergent economic performance. The graph below illustrates this point with the example of one variable but the same pattern applies to the others. Note that the performance of the developers remains below the mid-point of possible values, suggesting that while governance is better in these countries, it is still not good, an important point to which we return later.¹³

This observation led us to ask when this difference in governance began. Were developers always better than laggards or did they undergo some change in the quality of their governance at some point before 2000. If the difference was always there, then governance might not have much to do with the growth difference between our countries. But if a separation took place at some point before 2000, then it might be related to the increased growth divergence over the same period and it might point to a specific event or set of events that could help us explain the changes.

Because the Ibrahim data do not precede 2000, we switched to another source, the Inter-Country Risk Guide (ICRG) from Political Risk Service. While ICRG data are available from the mid-1980s, the indicators are not exactly similar to the Ibrahim variables. Moreover, there are no observations for Cape Verde, Lesotho and Rwanda among the developers, and for Burundi, Comoros and Eritrea among the laggards.

Nevertheless, working with what we have and aggregating three different relevant ICRG variables (bureaucratic quality, law and order, and corruption), we found that there was indeed a moment in the first half of the 1990s when developers (which were performing worse than laggards at first) overtook the laggards in terms of governance quality, as the graph below indicates. Both groups then sagged in the second part of the 1990s before stabilizing at fairly constant distance from each other as also indicated by the Ibrahim data.

The two main findings are as follows: First, there is a specific moment when differentiation takes place instead of a permanent difference or continuous governance improvements for developers; and second, the performance of developers is good relative to laggards but still below the mid-point in terms of absolute value – in contrast to their growth which is fast in absolute terms. This performance is a far cry from developmental statehood.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATORY ARGUMENTS

To what extent does current work on Africa’s growth and governance help us make sense of these patterns in our data? At this stage of the research, we can provide only preliminary and tentative answers to this question. We look here briefly at the apparent merits of three types of argument: the role of democracy, developmental patrimonialism, and the possible effects of security dilemmas. We then move on to explore a new hypothesis which emerged from the data.

The most obvious correlation in the time trends is between improvements in governance and the democratization of the early 1990s. This pattern might support the hypothesis that democratization brought about these improvements . The graph below, using Freedom House ‘s inverted scale, shows indeed that laggards are more uniformly non-democratic than developers.

There is no shortage of theories as to why this would be the case. Peter Lewis has written of the “elective affinity” between political and economic freedoms, of the greater accountability of democratic regimes to demands for better governance (a claim also made by Steven Radelet), and of the greater political voice of business communities in democratic regimes.¹⁴ Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle also argued almost 20 years ago that democratization in Africa proceeded from economic grievances; and Peter Lewis reminds us that we should not be surprised to see economic agendas at the core of democratic regimes.¹⁵ Ann Pitcher’s latest book, although focusing on privatizations more than overall governance, nevertheless makes the applicable argument that the more enforceable commitments of democratic regimes might provide some degree of explanation.¹⁶

However, the box-plot diagram above also indicates that developers are far from being uniformly democratic (actually, Ethiopia and Rwanda are two of the top three fastest growers). Booth and Cammack have also rather compellingly argued that development is less a principal-agent matter of accountability than one of collective action.¹⁷Moreover, while there is consistency in the democratic and governance transformations of the early 1990s, that does not necessarily mean that the former triggered the latter. Both might have been the effect of some other factor.

The developmental patrimonialism argument suggests that centralization of rents, long-term horizons and pro-active industrial policy are the hallmarks of developmental regimes in Africa.¹⁸ While this model matches Ethiopia and Rwanda fairly well, it is more of a stretch for the other developers in our sample, all of which are closer to the “competitive clientelism” model. The latter, however, is considered inimical to developmental governance. Even the likes of Ghana, Mozambique or Tanzania show relatively little of the proactive control that a developmental state is expected to exert over the economy. And a recent paper by Henning Melber calls the Namibian state “incompetent” rather than developmental.¹⁹ It seems to us therefore that the threshold provided by this theory is too high for explaining growth and development in most of Africa.

Finally, there is a convincing argument, mostly elaborated in the context of some Asian states, that security threats discipline states into being developmental.²⁰ Again, this argument matches well the conditions of Ethiopia and Rwanda where minority regimes issued from violent conflicts rely on development to generate the legitimacy they need to survive. But, it is once again less of a match with the rest of the sample, although we note that there are a few post-conflict states in our group, including Mozambique, Uganda, and Namibia, but these regimes have not recently faced an existential threat. However, we could see some post-conflict rebound in our data, or maybe the reflection of more structural changes brought about by such violent crises. In the same vein, it is worth noting that there is a large number of post-socialist countries in our “developers” group.

AFRICA’S ECONOMIC TURNAROUND: A MODEST HYPOTHESIS

While all these theories contain powerful explanatory elements, our data point us towards an additional albeit tentative hypothesis. What bothered us, to some extent, were the high thresholds of state behavior projected by the democratic, developmental-patrimonialism, and security theories. We did not see such transformed or transformative behavior in most of our “developers.” Rather, we saw minimal, almost baby-steps of enhanced governance somehow matched by large improvement in growth. It seemed that a more modest theory was needed to make sense of the economic turnaround in these countries, but one that could also make sense of the large effects of small changes.

We were also intrigued by the behavior of another variable that matched the growth performance of our two groups fairly well: Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). As the graph below suggests, our “developers” have been the recipients of significant and exponentially rising amounts of FDI, quite in contrast to the nearly flat line of “laggards.”

We wonder to what extent “developers” might be engaged in a signaling exercise aimed at foreign capital. Maybe small but noticeable governance changes, in their bureaucracies and institutions, have been sufficient over the last decade or so to attract large flows of FDI, especially if such changes contrast with the countries that have not introduced them. In an era of low interest rates, these small changes might have been enough to mitigate the perception of risk investors associate with Africa. Their investments might be in some early stages of manufacturing or in the provision of goods and services for African consumers. They can also tap the more limited but still substantial export commodities of some of these countries, particularly agricultural, and they might represent exploration costs in mineral or energy sectors (as in Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia or Tanzania).

Interestingly, such marginal changes would be quite possible without any fundamental political restructuring and would thus be compatible with the continuation of neopatrimonial practices. By and large, a different regime can be applied to foreign investors than exists for domestic actors. “One-stop shops” and other efficiency islands can be developed to reduce transaction costs for foreign investors and improve the ease of doing business, while prebendal and neopatrimonial logics persist in other state institutions.

Such an approach would reproduce the signaling practices of many African countries towards donors. Matt Andrews has shown that a few easy and relatively costless steps are usually taken to get the aid flowing before reforms actually stall.²¹ It would also be consistent with the “partial reform syndrome” that has been prevalent on the continent.²² More importantly, it would not require any significant changes to neopatrimonial practices (nor much institutional or policy capacity), as it would essentially bifurcate the institutional environment, making governance improvements in some sectors largely aimed at foreigners, while maintaining the same neopatrimonial logic for the rest of the state (and using some of the resources derived from the foreign sector to feed redistribution in the domestic one).

In this respect, the similarity between the logic and timing of governance and democratic reforms might not be particularly causal. They might both derive, on average, from the same signaling logic and might both preserve in the end, rather than reform, neopatrimonialism.

Although it must be emphasized that this hypothesis is at a preliminary stage, the combined data from both groups of countries is consistent with such a signaling argument. As we mentioned earlier, and the two graphs below illustrate, “developers” do not perform particularly well in absolute value. However, once countries pass a minimal threshold of differentiation with the performance of “laggards”, there is a visible FDI response.

In conclusion, we suspect that the economic turnaround in Africa’s resource-poor countries might derive from marginal and politically affordable governance changes largely geared towards attracting FDI without undermining the redistributive logic of domestic politics. If this hypothesis turns out to be accurate, then such strategies might be tested by likely changes in monetary policy in the West which could affect the cost-benefit calculus of investors.

Once again, our findings are preliminary and we offer them in the hope of contributing to discussions of this important topic. In summarizing our findings here, we have glossed over some nuances and variations. The next stage of this research will involve refining the quantitative work, breaking down the nature and sectors of foreign direct investments, developing qualitative narratives of governance reforms in “developers” to further examine the signaling hypothesis, and implementing other useful suggestions that readers of this blog will be kind enough to share with us.

Bibliography

1. “The Political Adjustment of Politics in Africa,” World Development, 18, 7 (1990).
2. The full title of the draft paper from which this essay is derived is ‘Small steps for Governance but a Giant Leap for Development? The Politics of Growth in Resource-Poor African Countries’. Some of these preliminary findings were presented at the African Studies Association annual meeting in Indianapolis, Indiana, this past November.
3. For example, see https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2013/07/03/governance-and-economic-growth-in-africa-rethinking-the-conventional-paradigm/ andhttps://africaplus.wordpress.com/2014/04/03/africas-third-liberation-transitions-to-inclusive-growth-and-developmental-governance/.
4. Mushtaq Khan. “Governance and Growth: History, Ideology, and Methods of Proof.” In Akbar Noman et al (eds.). Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies. Oxford University Press, 2012, 51-79.
5. E.g., Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa.Cambridge University Press, 1997; Richard Joseph. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. Cambridge University Press, 1987; Richard Sandbrook, “The State and Economic Stagnation in Tropical Africa.” World Development, 1986, 14(3): 319-332.
6. Steven Radelet. Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way.Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2010; Peter Lewis. “Democracy and Economic Performance.” In Ellen Lust and Stephen Ndegwa (eds.). Governing Arica’s Changing Societies: Dynamics of Reform. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012, 45-72.
7. Ann Pitcher, Mary Moran and Michael Johnston. “Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa,” African Studies Review, 2009, 52(1):125-156; Daniel Bach and Mamoudou Gazibo. Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond.London: Routledge, 2012.
8. Tim Kelsall. Business, Politics and the State in Africa. London: Zed Books 2013; Booth, David and Fred Golooba-Mutebi. “Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda.” African Affairs, July 2012, 111(444): 379-403.
9. Hazel Gray and Lindsay Whitfield. “Reframing African Political Economy: Clientelism, Rents and Accumulation as Drivers of Capitalist Transformation.” London School of Economics: Working Paper Series 14-159, October 2014.
10. Meles Zenawi. “States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the Case for a Developmental State.” In Noman et al. op.cit., 140-174.
11. We did not include Liberia because of the role of donors in its economic performance, which has disconnected policy choices from domestic political realities. See Amos Sawyer. “Emerging Patterns in Liberia’s Post-Conflict Politics,”African Affairs, 2008, 107(427):180; and Radelet, op.cit., 7.
12. http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/. The index starts in 2000, but not all indicators have data for every year. We average data for available years.
13. Ibrahim extrapolates this indicator backwards from 2006 to 2000, hence the straight line over that period, but the trend is similar for those that have actual data going back to 2000.
14. Peter Lewis, op.cit., 47-48; Radelet, op.cit.
15. Bratton and van de Walle, op.cit.; Lewis, op. cit.
16. Anne Pitcher. Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa’s Democracies.Cambridge University Press, 2012.
17. David Booth and Diana Cammack. Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective Action Problems. London: Zed Books, 2013.
18. Kelsall, op.cit., inspired by the work of Khan.
19. Henning Melber, “The Namibian State of Development: Evidence for a Developmental State?” Paper presented at the 2014 meeting of the African Studies Association, Indianapolis, Indiana.
20. Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie and Dan Slater. “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective,” International Organization, 2005, 59, 327-361.
21. Matt Andrews. The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
22. Nicolas van de Walle. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999. Cambridge University Press.

Article cross posted from AfricaPulse.wordpress.com

Is the African Union needed?

The African Union summit in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, ended on Saturday with delegates from more than 50 member states attending.

The plan was to discuss gender equality and sustainable development across Africa. But the African Union’s overall purpose is much wider.

Its goal is to protect human rights, defend African positions on international issues, and bring the continent together on social and economic topics.

But has the African Union been up to the job? Can it still help Africans?

Presenter: Sami Zeidan

Guests:

Michael Amoah – Research associate with the Centre of African Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

Thembisa Fakude – Researcher at the Al Jazeera centre for studies.

Dismas Mokua – Deputy president of Africa Axis, a consultancy focused on doing business in Africa.

Erastus Mwencha – Deputy chairman of the African Union.

Source: Al Jazeera

Governance Ahead: Understanding the African Union’s African Governance Architecture, African Peace and Security Architecture and the linkages between them.

Africa has made considerable strides in striving towards democratic and participatory governance. Today, African leaders are convinced, more than ever before, that democratic governance and durable peace are a fundamental sine qua non for sustainable human development. All major Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU) normative frameworks bear testimony to this firm conviction by African leaders including the 2000 Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The AU has undergone a paradigm shift from the old OAU doctrine of non-interference to the new doctrine of non-indifference to human rights abuses, mass atrocity and crimes against humanity within its Member States. However, while we have made tremendous progress, existential threats of democracy persist. This is the context within which the African Governance Architecture (AGA) was established.

The African Governance Architecture in a nutshell

The AGA is a direct by-product of the AU Shared Values Agenda. In February 2010, the 14^th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly endorsed a decision taken earlier by the Executive Council (EX.CL/Dec.525(XVI), recommending the theme of the 16^th Ordinary Summit to be on Shared Values, while also putting in place a Pan-African Architecture on Governance. Subsequently, in January 2011, the 18^th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council endorsed the strengthening of the AGA, through the launch of the African Governance Platform as an informal and non-decision making mechanism to foster exchange of information, facilitate the elaboration of common positions on governance, and strengthen the capacity of Africa to speak with one voice.

The AGA and its Platform became operational in 2012, the very year declared by AU policy organs as the Year of Shared Values. The AGA was established to translate the objectives of the legal and policy pronouncements on AU Shared Values, as the implementation framework for the promotion and sustenance of democracy, human rights and governance in Africa. By AU Shared Values, we mean those values, norms and standards as enshrined in the Union’s various instruments such as freedom, human rights and the rule of law, tolerance, respect, community spirit, gender equality, youth empowerment, unity in diversity, constitutionalism, democratic governance, peace, security stability, development, environmental protection, popular participation, accountability and transparency, strong democratic institutions, anti-corruption, improved service delivery, equality, credible and democratic elections, durable solutions to humanitarian crises and free movement of African citizens across borders of AU member states.

The principal goals of the AGA are to connect, empower and build capacities of AU Organs, Regional Economic Communities and relevant stakeholders, including civil society, in order to enhance good governance and democracy in Africa. Through the AGA, the Union is facilitating the implementation, support and complementing the efforts of AU Member States to achieve the above commitments enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act and other relevant standards and norms. To ensure coordination and synergy amongst all the various organs, institutions and the RECs on governance, democracy and human rights issues, the Africa Governance Platform serves as the dialogue and information-sharing forum for the achievement of the goals of the AGA. It provides an avenue for consultations, coordination, dialogue and collective action among the various AU Organs and Institutions for lesson learning and experience-sharing on how best to deepen democratic and participatory governance on the continent.

How complementary are the AGA and the APSA?

The AGA cannot succeed without a strong complementarity with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). One of the specific objectives of the AGA indeed is to ‘facilitate joint engagement in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction and development associated with governance challenges in Africa’.(1) Thus both the AGA and APSA are supposed to address the structural root causes of crisis and conflict in Africa. It is only when democratic and participatory governance is institutionalised and peace and political stability prevail that Africa stands a better chance for sustainable human development and prosperity for its citizens. This is also the vision of the AU elaborated in the Africa Agenda 2063 and the Common African Position on Post-2015 Development Agenda.

We are mindful that while inter-state conflicts have subsided in Africa, intra-state conflicts have persisted even in the post-Cold War situation. These conflicts continue to derail our development goals, postpone democratic gains and generate humanitarian crises in different ways;

(i) weak state institutions are unable to exercise authority over their territorial jurisdictions;

(ii) given weak institutions, provision of development and services to the people suffers thereby generating crisis of legitimacy of the state;

(iii) a militarisation of society and establishment of military formations contest space with the formal security establishment thereby generating disorder and near-anarchy;

(iv) mismanagement of diversity through, inter-alia, politicisation of ethnic identity and ethnicisation of politics which triggers intra-state conflict;

(v) mismanagement of and contestation over natural resources;

(vi) environmental degradation and climate change which in turn exerts pressure on rural communities resulting in violent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, and

(vii) socio-economic exclusion, inequality, unemployment and marginalisation. These are the structural root causes that propel violent conflicts and instability in Africa with devastating impacts on peace, democracy and development. Failure to address these root causes will confine all our responses to mere symptoms of the problem.

The AGA is designed as the comprehensive, overarching and consolidated framework for addressing issues of governance and governance related challenges aimed at addressing structural causes of political instability and crisis through inter alia, preventive diplomacy, mediation, negotiated settlement of conflicts, humanitarian assistance and durable solutions, reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction and development. The AGA addresses the governance and democracy mandate of the AU, the APSA addresses the peace and security agenda and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) deals with the developmental agenda of the continent.

Strengthening the institutional linkages between the AGA and the APSA

There are various Shared Values instruments that facilitate cooperation between the AGA and the APSA. These include most notably the 2000 AU Constitutive Act, the 2000 Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), the 2003 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council, the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the 2009 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy Framework. More recently, the Africa Agenda 2063, which is to be adopted during the Summit of Heads of State and Government in January 2015, and the Common African Position on Post-2015 Development Agenda are additional policy frameworks which underline the need for cooperation between and among the AGA, APSA and the AU development architecture.

In practice, however, the AGA and APSA do not yet have strong institutional connections. The main arenas that provide glue between the two AU architectures are the technical and political meetings of the AGA and the operations of the Peace and Security Council. APSA institutions, such as the Peace and Security Council, are supposed to take part in the AGA technical and political meetings. The technical meetings are attended by technical staff of the AGA member institutions while the political meetings are attended by the political heads of the institutions. The other arena relates to the workings of the Peace and Security Council. AGA Clusters regularly provide situational analysis to members of the Peace and Security Council on various issues including

(i) elections in Africa,

(ii) human rights situation in Africa, and on the

(iii) humanitarian situation in Africa.

A great opportunity for further strengthening the linkages between the AGA and APSA can be found in the African Union Post-Conflict Recovery and Development (PCRD) policy framework, and the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI). The African Solidarity Initiative was launched by AU Ministers of Foreign Affairs/External Relations on 13^th July 2012 with the view to mobilising support from within Africa for post-conflict reconstruction and development in those countries emerging from protracted violent conflict. The main objective of the ASI is to promote African solidarity, mutual assistance and regional integration, and propel the continent to a higher level of development and self-confidence, driven by the motto: ‘Africa helping Africa’.

A more comprehensive approach tested in Central African Republic

(Pic courtesy of aljazeera.com)

One concrete example of collaboration between the AGA and APSA is the initiative in Central African Republic (CAR) where the Department of Political Affairs  and the Department of Peace and Security work together to assist the country in implementing a post-conflict reconstruction and development programme. This intervention is guided by the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy Framework.

The initiative focuses, partly, on rebuilding CAR’s governance system. Specifically, the initiative prioritised the following areas of governance reforms in CAR:

• The drafting of a new Constitution
• The electoral process
• The public sector reform
• Inclusion and management of the diversity

The long-term plan is to replicate PCRD interventions in CAR in other countries. Resources permitting, we aim to do so in the seven other pilot countries of the African Solidarity Initiative, namely Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and South sudan, as well as Mali and Madagascar.

Annual High Level Dialogue which focuses on the nexus between governance and conflict

(Dr. Khabele Matlosa, Director for Political Affairs at the Department of Political Affairs at the 2014 High Level Dialogue in Dakar, Senegal)

Finally, a good opportunity for further strengthening the synergy between the AGA and APSA can be found in the Annual High Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, which is one of the key flagship initiatives of the AGA that started in 2012. This forum is one of the knowledge generation and dialogue series which has proved extremely useful in providing a frank, open and inclusive platform for Member States, AU Organs and Institutions, RECs, African citizens, think tanks, civil society, media, private sector, philanthropists, and development actors to engage and share comparable experiences and lessons on how to improve governance, consolidate democracy and foster effective realisation of human and peoples’ rights on the continent.

The 2014 High Level Dialogue had its theme as ‘Silencing the Guns: Improving Governance for Preventing, Managing and Resolving Conflicts in Africa’. This provided a platform for exploration of how democratic and participatory governance could be leveraged to silence Africa’s blazing guns in line with the agenda of the Peace and Security Council. A pre-forum to interrogate issues around the contribution of young Africans to building a culture of democracy and peace in Africa was held in Nairobi on 15-17^thSeptember 2014, while the Nairobi Forum focused on the role of youth in this process of ending wars on our continent, on 7-10^th October 2014, another forum aimed at exploring the specific role for women in this drive towards inculcating a culture of peace and democracy. The outcomes of these preparatory meetings were fed into the High Level Dialogue on 30-31 October 2014 in Dakar, Senegal. This provided another impetus to further strengthen the synergies between AGA and APSA.

Operational elements of the APSA

The operational elements of the APSA are:

• The Continental Early Warning System
• Peace and Security Council
• Panel of the Wise
• African Standby Force
• African Union Commission
• Regional Economic Communities

In addition, The AU’s work to support post-conflict transition processes is guided by the:

• Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD)

Footnote

[1] AGA Framework Document, June 2014.

Interviewee:Dr. Khabele Matlosa, Director for Political Affairs at the Department of Political Affairs, African Union Commission conducted by Faten Aggad, Head of Africa’s Change Dynamics Programme at ECDPM.

This article was published in GREAT insights Volume 4, Issue 1 (December 2014/January 2015)

The passion of uncle Ruckus, House of Slaves, the Slave Trade

Uncle Ruckus: If you black of skin and full of sin, come forward so I may lay my hands on you.

[slaps a black man]

Uncle Ruckus: Black be gone!
[slaps black woman]

Uncle Ruckus: Praise White Jesus!
[slaps another black man]

Uncle Ruckus: Now, I want everybody to find the nearest black man and lay hands on him. But first, make sure your hand is balled up in a fist so you can beat the black outta his soul. God smiles when you hate blackness so you beat that darkie in the name of the Almighty! Hallelujah!
[the whole congregation starts beating each other. Granddad pulls Tom away from the melee]

Uncle Ruckus: That’s right! Ronald Regan said ‘Beat a blackie and go to Heaven.’ God is good! Now, let us pray. Lord, I have spent my whole life hating you for making me black. And now I see I must hate myself and all those like me. And cause them misery just like your servant, Ronald Reagan did. And if any of my words don’t come directly from the Almighty God himself, then may I be struck by lightning right this very instant! Halle-

[Ruckus is struck by lightning]

Uncle Ruckus: AAAAHHHHHHH!

(Scene from Boondocks)

Pause and Rewind.

I would like to go back in time, back to a place where being black was indeed a crime and burden, a place that knows pain and anguish, has seen both tears and immense fear, witnessed countless deaths as well as countless atrocities; a place known for the role that it played in the slave trade era; that place being Goree Island.

To be more specific, the place is Maison des esclaves, a slave house that has in fact been preserved well and looks just as it did several hundreds of years ago.

As I set foot into the building, I couldn’t help but try and fathom what was going through the minds of women, children and men as they stepped into the house back then. Some fighting to avoid getting in despite the heavy shackles on their feet; others silent from the acceptance of their impending doom; others being unable to look their children in the eye, while others breaking down from the sight of them. Honestly, I couldn’t fathom it, and just those thoughts in themselves made my chest tense up.

Below is a picture showing the manner in which the slaves were ferried across; stacked as if lifeless objects or what you would of marbles in a bowl.

Below is the children’s room which is about 8 square foot in size and that held 30 in number. Children were separated from their parents and were left to relieve themselves within the same space; this is the same place in which they were fed.

Below is one of the windows in the room, one can see that the opening narrows outward to avoid the children from escaping.

Below is where the rogue prisoners were kept. A small space underneath the stairs that led to the colonial master’s quarters above. The prisoners were stacked there whether dead or alive. One can only imagine the trauma and disease.

A sobering fact to note is that the colonial masters held parties and hosted dinners in the top quarters while the slaves were at the bottom barely a few metres away.

Quite the sobering and heart wrenching visit.

The slave trade era dates back hundreds of years yet whose reverberations still ring true today. This is what I wish to write on today. Mental slavery as witnessed through uncle Ruckus above and many of us through our day to day activities.

On various platforms today, be it political, social or economic, Africa is still yet to rid itself of its shackles.

(Art piece by Goree Island resident)

For starters, when did it become okay for us to export majority of our agricultural produce when our citizens still die from hunger?

The recently convened African Union second high level private sector and agribusiness meeting saw discussions surrounding this topic. A participant rightly put it when he stated that Africa has lagged behind in emancipating itself from slavery giving the example of Nigeria which imports tea from England when it could do so from Kenya. This statement is not only true for the West African state, but one that sheds light on the entire continent. Today intra African trade stands at barely 12%.

Moving on, when was it ever okay to require 33 visas to travel around Africa? In fact to connect between some countries in Africa, one needs to leave the continent only to fly back in.

When did headlines such as these ever become acceptable especially in the year 2014?

“14 African Countries Forced by France to Pay Colonial Tax for the Benefits of Slavery and Colonization”

The article continues as follows… “14 African countries are obliged by France, trough a colonial pact, to put 85% of their foreign reserve into France central bank under French minister of Finance control. Until now, 2014, Togo and about 13 other African countries still have to pay colonial debt to France.” To read the full article kindly do so here.

Where did we go wrong?

“Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery, none but ourselves can free our minds,” Bob Marley stated.

Indeed there is no temptation so insidious as the one of pointing fingers when it comes to slavery today. No one is to blame but us. Uncle Ruckus rants are our own doing.

When will we begin to take pan africanism and the African renaissance seriously?

“Besides, political independence, though worthwhile in itself, is still only a means to the fuller redemption and realization of a people. When independence has been gained, positive action requires a new orientation away from the sheer destruction of colonialism and towards national reconstruction. It is indeed in this address to national reconstruction that positive action faces its gravest dangers. The cajolement, the wheedling, the seductions and the Trojan horses of neocolonialism must be stoutly resisted, for neocolonialism is a latter-day harpy, a monster which entices its victims with sweet music. In order to be able to carry out this resistance to neo-colonialism at every point, positive action requires to be armed with an ideology, an ideology which, vitalizing it, and operating through a mass party with a regenerative concept of the world and life, forge for it a strong continuing link with our past and offer to it an assured bond with our future. Under the searchlight of an ideology, every fact affecting the life of a people can be assessed and judged, and neo-colonialism’s detrimental aspirations and sleights of hand will constantly stand. In order that this ideology should be comprehensive, in order that it should light up every aspect of the life of our people, in order that it should affect the total interest of our society, establishing a continuity with our past, it must be socialist in form and in content and be embraced by a mass party.” Kwame Nkurumah

(Friends at the door of no return)

Video series: Experiences and Lessons from the field on Silencing the Guns in Africa: Strengthening Democratic Governance

What are experiences and lessons if they do not evoke an emotion out of you to do better?

This session was moderated by the eloquent, graceful and beautiful Ms. Belinda Moses, Co-founder and COO, San Media.

In beginning this discussion, Ms. Moses raised the pertinent aspect of embracing media to showcase, complement and enhance the discussions being held.The video below depicts the atrocities of war and undoubtedly does have some graphic images but all the more reason to watch it to the end.

Prof. Ndioro Ndiaye, former minister for Women and Children, Republic of Senegal, a panelist in the session reiterated the need for promotion of good governance from the ground up and not in the reverse. Her point of view was expounded further by Dr. Kayode Fayemi, Former Executive Governor of Ekiti State, Nigeria, who emphasized the need for creating social safety nets for young people to implement the same. “We must turn around corrupt and unaccountable governments in Africa by strengthening democratic governance institutions,” he stated.

“We have a diverse youth in Africa and unfortunately there is a segment of the youth becoming poorer, we need to cater to them,” reiterated his counterpart H.E Mme Maya Sahli, Fadel Commissioner, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights.

Dr. Vasu Gounden, Executive Director ACCORD took us down memory lane as he recollected the sobering misdeeds that were undertaken in 1994 when South Africa avoided a massive blood bath. This is when the right wing movement attempted to curtail all progress made on democracy. This included 50,000 armed men who had been thoroughly trained to kill and destroy during the country’s first elections. How the country was able to surmount this challenge is a miracle. Kindly watch below:

Dr. Gounden informed the audience of the consequences brought about by profound socio-economic inequality. Today, South Africa has one of the highest numbers of social protest and it comes as no surprise. “We need to close the gap in development and education. When people enter politics because they have no other alternative to close their own personal gaps, then we are in trouble,” he stated.

Ibraheem Sanusi  rightly put it when he stated that we should strive to not only want a continent not at war, but one that respects and upholds human rights and builds peace together.

Here’s a video that sums it up. #DGTrends

Scene-setting: “Silencing the Guns by 2020” What is at stake?

For those who were old enough then, remember the period between 1970 to 1990? When single parties were the talk of day, military coups and attempted military coups the order of the day?

Fast forward to the ‘90s; competitive politics came into play and countries far and wide within the African continent celebrated multiparty elections; thus true democracy was born.

Today however, we still grapple with challenges in democracy, good governance and human rights. A good number of countries are experiencing impunity, violent conflict, corruption,  rigged elections, lack of participatory and inclusive development and violation of human rights especially of women and youth but to name a few.

So how then does the African state intend to silence the guns in 5 years knowing full well the challenges being faced? What really is at stake here?

H.E Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Chairperson of the Africa Union Commission has consistently emphasized the role of democratic governance in doing so. She has often times spoken on the fact that stable peace and national prosperity can only be achieved when the institutions and systems in place are representative of all groups in a given society. “Efforts must include fostering democratic governance, social cohesion and harmony as encapsulated in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, among other AU normative frameworks. Only through democratic governance and durable solutions can durable peace and sustainable human development be achieved.”

She continues by informing that to surmount the aspirational and inspirational milestone of silencing the guns within the framework of AU Agenda 2063, we would require translating AU resolutions into solutions through concrete policy interventions at member state level. In achieving this, we would need to focus on addressing the structural causes of conflict on our continent which are rooted in both governance deficits and development malaise.

Prof. Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of International Relations Department, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, raised the poignant aspect of silenced the guns being feasible not only in five years, but today. “When heads of state decide to lead from a conscientious point of view, wars in Africa will be nothing but history,” he stated. This is only possible where leaders decide to silence their own guns and not turn them on the societies that they lead. “To end wars we just have to be honest about what we are doing wrong,” the Prof. informed.

“As a continent we need to harness the inspirational element of doing things, we must dissuade ourselves from engaging in pessimistic tenets of life. We have managed to build a culture of competitive politics in 25 years, in that same spirit we can strengthen institutions of participation, accountability and transparency,” he stated.

“Some say it is impossible, but take a look at Costa Rica, they are a well functioning and successful country without having a military. No one ever thought this would be possible, but it has been done.”

The fundamental aspect of all this is that we cannot achieve our goals without including the youth. Today and in the the year 2020, they will be the leaders, in 2063, they will be the ones passing the baton to the next generation. Incorporation of the future in the present cannot be underscored. Youth have to be at the genesis of the problem solving process in the continent.

Dr. Mustapha Mekideche, member of the APR Panel of Eminent Persons informed the group that growth without inclusive development would consistently pose an imminent threat to the progress of Africa. He informed the audience of the need to foresee the objectives of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism being met; that includes fostering the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through experience sharing and reinforcement of successful and best practices. This includes addressing deficiencies and assessment of requirements for capacity building. Evidently, the peer review mechanism goes a long way in addressing political, social and economic governance however in respect state sovereignty, membership of the same is on a voluntary basis. This has led to the unfortunate challenge of some states avoiding to commit to the objectives of the institutions or even to adhere to the recommendations given.

“The APRM reflects African values, who is afraid of these values?” Prof. Khadiagala asked.

I urge you to gain a better understanding of it to keep abreast and hold your governments accountable.  Public participation could not be emphasized at a more befitting time. For more information kindly visit here

We cannot afford to wait for external or regional pressure to get the systems in place working. Let us make a conscientious effort to enhance developmental governance; the success of this continent is ours for the taking,

Final Outcome statement: Third High Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in Africa #DGTrends

3^rd ANNUAL HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA:

TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

 

DAKAR, SENEGAL

30 – 31 OCTOBER 2014

OUTCOME STATEMENT

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION

INTRODUCTION

 

1. The 3^rd Annual High Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in Africa: Trends, Challenges, Prospects and Opportunities was held in Dakar, Senegal, on 30 to 31 October, 2014. The theme of the Dialogue was “Silencing the Guns – Strengthening Governance to Prevent, Manage and Resolve Conflicts in Africa.” It was attended by representatives from African Union (AU) Member States (Permanent Representatives Committee), African Governance Architecture Platform Members (AU Organs, Institutions and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), United Nations Agencies, Development Partners, Think Tanks, Civil Society, including women groups and youth organisations, Eminent African Personalities and Academia.

2. The 50^th Solemn Declaration committed Africa leaders to ending wars and violent conflicts by 2020. The overall objective of the Dialogue was to explore strategies for ending violent conflicts in Africa, and to propose policy recommendations for implementation at both African Union and Member States levels. The Dialogue reiterated the need for articulating perspectives and strategies for silencing Guns by 2020 through strengthening democratic governance as articulated in the 50^th Anniversary Solemn Declaration.

3. This ‘Outcome Statement’ is a summary of the key issues and recommendations made at the High Level Dialogue towards “Silencing the Guns” in Africa by 2020.

KEY ISSUES

4. Since independence, African states have made remarkable progress to build sturdy institutions of statehood and nationhood for managing diversity, encouraging participation, promoting equitable development, and encouraging regional integration. Furthermore, Africa has made profound strides to establish systems of democratic governance that have broadened competitive politics, improved democratic leadership changes, invigorated and enthused civic action, and resuscitated economies for growth and development.

5. Yet some parts of Africa remain saddled by violent conflicts and instabilities that are linked to competition over power and resources and the mismanagement of diversity. Conflicts in Africa are driven by governance and development deficits that reflect the challenges faced by institutions and mechanisms that seek to address the strains and pressures of pluralism and poverty. Widespread state fragility and national fragmentation combined with socioeconomic inequities continue to fuel violence and social discontent in many African countries. Democratization in the face of ethnic, sectarian, and religious fissures has exacerbated conflicts that have further strained efforts aimed at building effective, legitimate, and representative states.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. The High Level Dialogue reiterated the fact that ending wars and silencing the guns should be a collective responsibility of African citizens, AU Member States, the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, Civil Society Organizations, the Private Sector, Faith-Based Organizations, the Academia, and the international community. Participants noted, with a sense of optimism that AU Shared Values instruments, including the Constitutive Act of the African Union, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the ProtocolRelating to the Establishment of the Peace. and Security Council of the African Union, the African Peer Review Mechanism and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa all aim to strengthen democratic and participatory governance as well as peace and security in Africa. Democratic and participatory governance is both a pre-condition and outcome of durable peace, inclusive, equitable and people-centred development.

Re-Invigorating the Spirit of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance

7. Transformational regional integration requires that the processes of establishing inclusive and sustainable development are anchored on effective, efficient and accountable governance. Such democratic developmental governance dictates that African citizens are enabled to become drivers and owners of their own development and not just recipients of development projects and programmes without their effective participation. The AU Agenda 2063 and the Common African Position on the post-2015 development Agenda calls on African leaders and citizens to embrace the spirit of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance anchored on both people-to-people as well as institutional integration.

8. The operationalization of Agenda 2063 requires specific programmes and actions at national, regional and continental levels. The aim is to deepen a shared African identity, unity, integration, solidarity, self-confidence, collective self-reliance and self-respect all of which are integral parts of ending violent conflict on the continent. AU, RECs, Member States and the global pan-African community have to make a concerted effort to revive the Pan-Africanist Movement and support the convening of the 8th Pan-African Congress in Accra, Ghana in 2015.

9. The solidarity and unity of all Africans and Afro-descendants is critical to the achievement of the Agenda 2063. To ensure sustainable implementation of agenda 2063, Africa’s wealth and the resources it generates domestically should be deliberately applied through agreed mechanisms to finance and sustain the operationalization of Agenda 2063 and the common Africa position on post-2015 development agenda.

From Norm-Setting to Norm Implementation

1. The AU and RECs already have an expansive and robust set of normative frameworks for promoting democratic and participatory governance for peace and development. However, a huge gap exists between norm-setting and implementation of agreed norms and policies at national level. In some instances, AU Member States have limited human, material and financial resources to effectively domesticate and implement agreed continental policies and standards. This gap needs to be addressed by the AU, RECs and Member States as a matter of urgency. As a first step the Conference called for the establishment of time-bound implementation frameworks that have dedicated budgets as well as systems, competencies and capacities for monitoring, evaluation, reporting and follow up.

1. The conference called upon all AU Member States to ratify, domesticate and implement key AU Shared Values Instruments by the year 2020. They called upon the African Union Commission to ensure synergy and harmonization of the internal coordination, resourcing, capacity development and evaluation systems.

2. In particular, the Conference recommended stronger synergy and complementarity between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It was recommended that a joint working group of the AU Permanent Representative Committee, Peace and Security Council and AU Commission should be established and tasked with ensuring that APSA and AGA structures, processes and work plans are harmonized before the next High Level Dialogue in 2015.

Investing in Conflict Prevention, Early Warning and Early Recovery

3. The Conference noted that the AU, RECs and Member States have various forms of early warning and disaster response systems that operate with varying degrees of efficiency and effectiveness. It called for increased investment of time, energy and resources in preventive diplomacy, strengthening early warning and early recovery of conflict-affected countries.

4. This requires robust systems of detection of crisis signals, preventive diplomatic entry in volatile situations and candid analysis and reporting of conflict situations. Where such systems already exists, Member States, AU Organs and Institutions, Regional Economic Communities as well as civil society and the international community should share real and timely intelligence and pool the requisite resources and expertise for timely preventive responses before the eruption of full blown conflict as is the situation in Burkina Faso.

Building Capable, Effective and Legitimate States

5. The African State is central to developmental democratic governance, policy formulation and implementation, post-conflict recovery, building national cohesion, guaranteeing human and State security, decentralization and local economic development, enforcement of human rights and the social contract.

6. The conference called for redoubling of efforts to build institutional and administrative capacity of the African States. Capable, responsive, accountable and democratic States engender a culture of values and performance-based leadership and institutions. Such States have the requisite legitimacy and authority which leaves little room for social upheavals and rebellion born out of discontent, marginalization and exclusion. Effective state capacity is crucial for efficient service delivery and the fight against impunity, corruption and abuse of public office. State capacity is crucial for regulating illicit financial and capital outflows that are driven by vested internal and external interests and actors.

7. Capable democratic developmental African states stand a greater chance to silence the guns. The Conference called for capacity needs assessment in African countries that may require technical support especially those emerging from conflict. The AU, RECs and Member States through the existing governance, peace and security architectures should improve coordination and share comparable practices, lessons as well as human and financial resources to countries that require rebuilding and re-establishment of norms and institutions of democratic governance, peace and security.

Constructive Management of Diversity

8. The Conference called upon AU, RECs and Member States to harness African socio-cultural and intergenerational diversity for sustainable development anchored on the spirit of Pan Africanism and African Renaissance. Africa’s diversity should not be a curse, it should impel the continent towards greater unification and organic integration. Constructive management of diversity, including through: youth engagement and empowerment, specific language policies; proportional representation in electoral systems; political tolerance; local economic development, decentralization of power and resources as well as federal systems of governance should be strengthened by AU Member States as a tools of diversity management.

9. The African Union in partnership with African CSOs, youth and women formations, the Academia, and Media should create communities of practice for African countries to share lessons learnt, innovations and effective practices as a way of entrenching a culture of constructive management of diversity on the continent.

Preventing Electoral Violence

1. The conference noted that some elections in Africa have promoted democratization and peace-building. However, others have reversed the development and democratic gains made in the recent past and ignited bloodshed. Some aspects of electoral violence have resulted from electoral cycle factors such as inefficient management of elections, while others have structural root causes deeply hidden within socio-economic malaise such as unemployment, poverty and inequality.

1. The Conference recommended that in addressing and redressing electoral violence, AU, RECs and Member States should deal with both the electoral cycle related and structural causal factors so that policy responses go beyond mere symptoms of the problem. Member States, AU, RECs and civil society should thus make greater investment in long term pre-election assessments that integrate mediation, preventive diplomacy and effective management of potential electoral processes disputes.

2. The Conference noted a growing tendency to pressure countries emerging out of serious crises and conflicts into immediately holding elections as an ill-conceived policy option. African countries emerging from violent conflict should consider seriously the timing of post-conflict elections to ensure that they are premised upon solid foundations of peace, stability and political legitimacy. There is need to ensure that elections held soon after episodes of violent conflict or social upheaval have no potential of plunging countries back into cycle of political violence.

Demilitarising Politics

3. After decades of limited or absent coup d’etats, Africa has witnessed a resurgence of militarization of politics as an undemocratic phenomenon. The conference reiterated that demilitarization of politics is a crucial step in silencing the guns. It called for an end to the politicization of the security establishment and securitization of politics characterized by the politicization of formal security agencies or instances where political elites establish and control militias that work parallel to formal security agencies. In order to reverse this trend, the conference called upon African countries to recommit to professional security establishments accountable to civilian authority through parliament.

4. Formal security agencies should not compete for space with informal militias. African states should invest more resources in managing, regulating and controlling private security companies, which operate in national settings and across borders. The conference called upon the African Union Commission to propose a code of standards and practice for private security companies that operate at a regional level or in multi-country settings as well as mechanisms for ensuring their regional/continental accountability by December 2015.

Expanding the Frontiers of Human and Peoples’ Rights

5. In silencing the guns, Africa needs to do much more in the area of expanding the frontiers of a human rights culture. Human rights, especially the rights of women and girls must be protected and promoted. It is largely deficiencies in embracing a culture of human rights that has led to some of the tragic cases of mass atrocities and genocide in Africa.

6. Silencing guns in Africa entails committing to eradicating conditions that lead to international crimes, such as genocide and impunity, among others. African transitional justice mechanism should be embedded in the continent’s human rights architecture. This is where Africa-specific methodologies and culturally embedded strategies for transitional justice and conflict transformation, such as the Gacaca courts in Rwanda, the Ubuntu system in South Africa and Mot Oput in Northern Uganda become extremely useful and these should be strengthened and reinforced.

7. In support of the declaration by the African Union that 2015 is the Year for Women’s Empowerment in the Context of Agenda 2063 and 2016 as the Year for Human Rights, with special reference to the Rights of Women, the conference called for the theme of the 2015 High Level Dialogue to focus on women empowerment and leadership.

Managing Africa’s Natural Resources for Sustainable Development

8. Africa has normative frameworks at the Continental, RECs and national levels to govern the extractive sectors and natural resources generally. The intricate linkage between security and natural resource rent abuse or usage is a key factor to silencing the guns. The conference reiterated that Africa requires optimum and transparent extraction and beneficiation of its resources in order to sustainably combat insecurity and achieve sustainable development and peace.

9. It noted that the mismanagement of Africa’s natural resources has resulted in massive corruption that has left the African economy bleeding as clearly demonstrated by the Thabo Mbeki Panel Report and the Kofi Anan Africa Progress Report on illicit resource outflows and exploitation of Africa’s natural resources respectively. The conference noted that a growing number of Africa’s violent conflicts are over distribution of rents and benefits from these natural resources. Resource based conflicts often find virulent expression in religious and ethnic sectarianism and radicalisation.

1. The AU, RECs and Member States have to ensure effective governance, distribution and redistribution of Africa’s natural resources to address issues of corruption as well as illicit financial and capital outflows as envisaged by the African Mining Vision.

Addressing the Special Circumstances of Marginalized Social Groups

1. African nation-States are constituted by heterogeneous nation groups that sometimes are bounded by spatial, economic, social and political inequalities. These inequalities and class differences are often exacerbated by uneven development within regions in the same nation States. In their efforts to silence the guns, AU, RECs and Member States will need to address the specific circumstances and situations of marginalized social groups including women, children, young people, minorities and people with disabilities.

2. It is imperative that women and youth empowerment constitute part of the broader package for silencing guns. Interest of children, minorities and people with disabilities need to be taken into account during conflict situations, during processes of peace-building and development process in peace time. The consolidation and effective implementation of various national and continental women and youth engagement strategies by Member States, the African Union, RECs, and civil society formations is a critical component of efforts geared towards silencing the guns by 2020.

3. The conference recommended that existing continental benchmarks and frameworks on empowerment of vulnerable and marginalized social groups should be made an integral part of AU democratic governance, peace building and conflict transformation processes. In order for this to be sustained, tools and mechanisms for mainstreaming the existing normative expectations should be developed and AU Mediators should be sensitized on how to use the same.

Addressing Forced Displacement Due to Violent Conflicts

4. The Conference noted that the disproportionate impact of violent conflicts on the continent includes the massive forced displacement of communities leading to millions of internally displaced people, refugees, stateless people or irregular migrants. In most conflict zones such as the Horn, the Sahel, the Great Lakes regions and parts of North Africa especially Libya forced migration accounts for over 10 million refugees and equally high numbers of internally displaced persons. Data sources indicate that 43 000 young Africans have died since the year 2000 trying to cross the high seas to seek perceived better opportunities in Europe. While some of these are economic migrants, others are political refugees fleeing violence in their countries.

5. The conference called upon the AU, RECs and Member States to find durable solutions to forced displacement in Africa due to wars and violent conflicts by strengthening early warning and response systems. But once wars erupt, remedial measures are needed to mitigate their adverse impact on civilian populations.

6. The AU, RECs, Member States and international community should work closely to establish locally owned and led support systems for the affected communities and States. The AU, RECs and Member States need to work closely together on the Common African Position on Humanitarian Situation in Africa in readiness for the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, Turkey in June 2016.

Promoting Reconciliation, Social Healing and National Harmony

7. The Conference noted that national and local systems and cultures of peace are linked to governance mechanisms and processes designed to guarantee justice, freedom and human rights. A key foundation to achieving national cohesion is national reconciliation and recovery processes. In pursuance of the Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.501 (XXII) declaring 2014-2024 as the Madiba Nelson Mandela Decade of Reconciliation in Africa, the AU, RECs and Member States should invest a lot more in efforts aimed at reconciliation and social harmony with a view to facilitating successful nation-building in Africa.

8. In countries emerging from violent conflicts, a good mixture of social healing, justice and accountability mechanisms is required for sustainable peace and democracy building. The conference called upon AU, RECs and Member States to adopt and implement the AU Transitional Justice framework as a means to addressing issues of impunity, national reconciliation and recovery anchored upon the principles of justice, peace, and reconciliation as encapsulated in the AU Shared Values instruments.

Promoting equitable, inclusive and participatory socio-economic development

9. Democratic and participatory governance and peace and security are key pre-conditions for sustainable human development, which is people-centered. Most of violent conflicts in Africa have their root causes in both development failure and governance deficits. In order to address the structural root causes of violent conflict, socio-economic challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality should be addressed effectively. The conference reiterated the need to ensure that economic policy is rationalized with social policy and adequate investment in the productive capacities of African States and peoples. In particular, the conference called for economic and social policies that evolve out of participatory processes and advance a culture of democracy and peace.

1. The conference reaffirmed the imperative of greater engagement and participation of African citizens in state and continental affairs especially policy making and implementation towards silencing the guns. The conference commended the AU for improving its social media engagement strategy with African citizens and called for revamping and strengthening of the continental platform for engaging civil society and citizens – the Economic Social and Cultural Council – and the use of traditional media and other participatory processes such as people to people dialogues, information sharing and feedback with Member States in order to ensure continental and national policies are owned and driven by beneficiaries.

Promoting Knowledge Generation, Policy Analysis and Dissemination

1. The AU, RECs and Member States should engage, partner and cooperate more with African think tanks, universities, research institutes and the media in generating and disseminating evidenced based knowledge, research and policy analysis on strengthening democratic governance, addressing violent conflicts with a view to sharpening their policy responses and interventions aimed at silencing guns on the continent.

High Level Dialogue: What will it take to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2020?

(Pic Courtesy of dgtrends.org)

“Guns don’t usually talk, but when we make them talk, they shout, BOOM BOOM.”

In kick starting discussions on what it would take to silence the guns; H.E Olusegun Obasanjo unsparingly reminded us of the consequences of guns blazing in the continent; their impact on human development, economic development and the extent to which they destroy families, majority of the time women and the youth.

“Identity, colonial legacy, democracy, popular participation, resource management, religion and inequality must be addressed now,” stated the former president of the Republic of Nigeria. We need to give more weight to discussions on the elimination of corruption and correct interpretation of religion. Youth are our present and future and we need to ensure education and employment for all.”

“I admit that we did not address the civil war in Nigeria well, we didn’t look at the aspects of diversity dividing us; and it is for this reason that I believe the extent to which lessons learnt are shared is pertinent in managing and preventing conflict. Our war lasted 30 months; I realized that I am a Yoruba but my Yorubaness could not overtake my Nigerianess. That we must embrace our diversity for collective national development,” he stated.

“With the state having three pillars of government borrowed from colonialism, that being the executive, the legislature and judiciary, so too do we need a fourth pillar which is a higher authority of active solidarity,” informed the former head of state. “This is the only way that we can deal with the problem of social frustration and subsequently disallowing it to fester.”

Advocate Thuli Madonsela, the Public protector in South Africa shared too her views on silencing the guns. In a somber tone, she reiterated the need for respect of the rule of law during elections and civil and political rights. The impressive prosecutor highlighted the dire consequences of inadequate public awareness and citizens’ rights emphasizing the paramount importance of ensuring access to good information by citizens. “Where people are misinformed or ignorant they will create their own narratives and take the law into their own hands,” she stated. She also raised the pertinent point of benevolent governments needing checks and balances because they too are prone to making mistakes.

(Pic Courtesy of dgtrends.org)

Dr. Noha Bakr, Assistant minister of International cooperation in Egypt posed a poignant question to the audience as she shared her views on the aforementioned topic. “There is no spring in Africa, how then did we end up calling it the arab spring? We did not anticipate the repercussions of not walking our talk.”

The Egyptian assistant minister emphasized the need to address high levels of illiteracy and shared on their experiences in Egypt. She highlighted the poignant aspect of democracy being measured through the ballot boxes as fictitious and wrong benchmarking. “Democracy with regards to the ballot box is not about elections alone but also incorporates the ballot boxes in oil and resource matters.

Dr. Brice Parfait Kolelas, Minister of Public Service and State reforms, Republic of Congo shared in these sentiments and spoke on the need for synergy between institutions dealing with democracy, human rights and governance. “Today, we can learn a great deal from the National Commission for Social dialogue in Congo,” he stated.

H.E Olusegun Obasanjo in ending his experiences with the forum, shared the sobering story of a young rebel leader that he once met from the Niger delta. The former head of state was extremely curious on how the young man had ended up in such an unfortunate role and the young boy  responded as follows.

“Your Excellency, due to free primary education I went to primary school, I did extremely well and hence secured a place in secondary school; and I then went to university. There I pursued a career in mining engineering seeing as I come from a resource rich country. I graduated and could not get a job for 4 years, what do you expect me to do?”